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This paper tackles the issue of optimum product diversity in an 
imperfectly competitive market with small or large firms. First, 
it develops a quadratic utility model of monopolistic competition 
with horizontal product differentiation which avoids some of the 
main pitfalls of the S-D-S approach. Second, it extends the model 
to the case of multiproduct firms showing how product diversity is 
affected with respect to monopolistic competition. In particular, it 
is shown that monopolistic competition with single-product firms 
is the limiting case of oligopolistic competition with multiproduct 
firms when either varieties gets more and more differentiated or 
when the entry cost goes further and further down.
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Product differentiation enlarges the scope of welfare analysis in the pres­
ence of imperfect competition. Pricing above marginal costs might well 
not be the main source of inefficiency in differentiated markets. The 
reason is that there are two other potential sources of inefficiency: the 
number of products supplied by the market (product variety) and the 
specification of the products made available to the consumers (product 
selection). As neatly posited by Spence (1976a, p.408):
‘a significant fraction of the cost of imperfect competition 
may be due to the currently unmeasured cost of having too 
many, too few, or the wrong products.’
The two pillar papers that investigate these potential losses are 
Spence (1976b) and Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). Both are based on a simi­
lar interpretation of Chamberlin’s (1933) ideas about monopolistic com­
petition. Hence the common label of S-D-S model.
In the S-D-S model monopolistic competition emerges as a market 
struct me determined by consumers’ heterogeneous tastes and firms fixed 
requirements for limited productive resources.1 On the demand side, the 
set of consumers with different tastes are aggregated into a representative 
consumer whose preferences exhibit love of variety: she demands vari­
eties of a horizontally differentiated good and her utility is an increasing 
function not only of the amount of each variety consumed but also of 
the total number of varieties available. On the supply side, production 
exhibits economies of scale within varieties but no economies of scope 
across varieties. Consequently, each firm supplies one and only one vari­
ety (monopolistic). However, there are no entry or exit barriers so that 
profits are just enough to cover average cost (competition). Finally, there
1 The assumption of a representative consumer displaying love of variety stands for 
a heterogenous population of consumers. And indeed, it can be shown that the CES 




























































































are many firms so that firms do not interact directly through strategic 
interdependence but only indirectly through aggregate demand effects.
In this setting there is no obvious a priori on whether the market 
provides too many or too few varieties (Spence, 1976b). On the one 
hand, since revenues from producing a certain variety do not capture the 
corresponding consumer surplus, they may not cover costs even when 
the net social value of the variety is positive. This creates a potential 
bias towards too few varieties. On the other hand, when a new variety 
is introduced, it affects the profits of existing firms and gives rise to 
another external effect because the profit of the new entrant does not, 
in general, correspond to the net change in profits in the economy as 
a whole. If varieties are complements, this effect also favors too few of 
them. However, if varieties are substitutes, it fosters too many of them 
so that the net outcome is ambiguous (Stiglitz, 1986).
In addition, the presence of these countervailing distortions makes 
it difficult to establish a priori which kinds of varieties are likely to be 
supplied by the market. In the limit, even when the optimal number of 
varieties is provided, the available varieties may not be the optimal ones.
Therefore, we concur with Dixit and Stiglitz (1977, p.308) when 
they write:
‘The general principle (...) is that a market solution considers 
profit at the appropriate margin, while a social optimum takes 
into account the consumer’s surplus. However, applications of 
this principle come to depend on details of cost and demand 
functions’.
As a result, most of the investigations on the issue of optimum 
product diversification have been carried on through pedagogical exam­
ples with the aim of identifying those features of the market equilib­
rium which are important in determining whether there is likely to be an 
under-, over- or biased supply of variety (Stiglitz, 1986).
Spence (1976b) proposes two models. Both models feature two 




























































































horizontally differentiated varieties. Utility is additive in the two goods 
giving his model a strong partial equilibrium flavor. His aim is to relate 
product diversity to the own- and cross-elasticities between varieties. The 
first model captures love for variety via a generalized quadratic sub-utility 
function. The number of varieties is kept constant in order to analyze 
product selection: supply is biased against products whose revenues cap­
ture small fractions of the contributed surplus (i.e., have steep demand 
functions maybe due to a naturally limited set of buyers with extreme 
variegation in the valuation of the product). In the second model love for 
variety is translated into a generalized CES sub-utility function. Unlike 
the previous model, in order to gain insight on product diversification, 
varieties are assumed to enter utility symmetrically and their number is 
endogenized. The market outcome is compared with the social optimum 
in two cases. The first best optimum, obtained when lump sum transfers 
are available, and the second best optimum, arising when they are not 
(in which case profits cannot be negative). In the CES case, at the first 
best optimum firms make negative profits and there are more varieties 
than at the market equilibrium, while existing varieties are supplied in 
the same quantity. By contrast, the second best optimum and the market 
equilibrium are shown to coincide.
Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) complement Spence (1976b) by tackling 
the issue of intersectoral substitution in a general equilibrium framework. 
They concentrate on the case where the varieties in the differentiated 
commodity sector are good substitutes among themselves, but poor sub­
stitutes for the numéraire commodity. While their results stemming from 
intrasectoral elasticities mirror Spence’s, additional insights are provided 
on the role of intersectoral substitutability. In particular, they focus on 
a ‘central case’ (pp.298-302), which differs from Spence’s second model 
by assuming finite rather than infinite elasticity of intersectoral substi­
tution. In the central case, as in Spence (1976b), the market equilibrium 
coincides with the second best optimum while the first best optimum has 
a greater number of firms. Moreover, the elasticity of intersectoral sub­
stitution governs the resource allocation between the sectors. From the 




























































































of equilibrium and in the second-order conditions for an optimum.
Despite some other important contributions in the field (see, e.g. 
Hart (1985a, b), Wolinsky (1986), Deneckere and Rothschild (1992)), it is 
fair to say that most applications of monopolistic, not to say imperfect, 
competition theory to trade (Helpman and Krugman (1985)), growth 
(see, e.g. Romer (1990)), geography (see, e.g. Krugman (1991)), or 
macroeconomics (see, e.g. Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987)), have been 
carried out under the S-D-S model (see Matsuyama (1995) for a recent 
survey). It is therefore important to know the general validity of the 
conclusions derived under the S-D-S model.
The aim of this paper is twofold. First, we want to present an alter­
native model to the S-D-S one and check the robustness of its conclusions. 
In particular, it is our contention that our model can serve as an alterna­
tive to the S-D-S model, especially because of its better tractability when 
dealing with strategic considerations. Second, we wish to supplement the 
foregoing classical analyses by investigating the issue of product diversifi­
cation in the presence of multiproduct firms. This issue is not dealt with 
by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) while Spence’s (1976b) ‘[f]or reasons of space, 
(...) simply sketches] the argument and its implications’ (p.225). In a 
world where flexible manufacturing and multiproduct strategies become 
more and more relevant in business, this is certainly a useful extension.
To this end, we use a quadratic utility model of horizontal product 
differentiation which has often been employed in industrial organization 
(see, e.g. Dixit (1979) and Vives (1990)). There are several good rea­
sons for choosing this model First, it leads to very simple closed form 
for the equilibrium outcomes that can serve as a building block in much 
broader contexts. Second, it provides a first-order approximation of any 
demand system which is satisfactory once these demands are used to de­
scribe the market in the vicinity of the equilibrium. Hence it allows for 
a reconciliation of the two main approaches to monopolistic competition 
used in general equilibrium, that is, the ‘objective’ demand approach 
taken by Gabszewicz and Vial (1972) and the ‘subjective’ demand one 
suggested by Negishi (1961). Our model is therefore a natural starting 




























































































formally equivalent. Third, it can be interpreted as a setting in which 
firms are boundedly rational in that they extrapolate linearly their de­
mand around the solution to the first order conditions as in Bonanno 
(1988) and Gary-Bobo (1989). Last, unlike the CES demands, the linear 
demands do not satisfy the restrictive condition of independence from 
irrelevant alternatives according to which the ratio of demands for any 
two varieties is independent of the other varieties’ prices.
However, since we assume that preferences fire linear in the homo­
geneous good, the model can be used to study allocative issues but not 
redistributive ones. Furthermore, we consider a continuum of potential 
varieties as an alternative approach to the modelling of the supply side. 
Such a formulation is based on Aumann’s assumption of an atomless 
economy in which firms are represented by points inside a (distance-free) 
continuum of corresponding varieties (see Spence (1976b, section 5) for 
a similar idea as well as the original formulation developed by Dixit and 
Stiglitz in their working paper). This approach has become the standard 
choice adopted in the various applications of the S-D-S framework (see, 
e.g., Matsuyama (1995)). As we will argue below, the atomless assump­
tion is probably the most natural way to capture Chamberlin’s (1933) 
intuition regarding the working of a ‘large group’ industry. This also 
allows us to get rid of the integer problem which often leads to inelegant 
results and cumbersome developments.
The atomless approach does not necessarily implies that firms be­
have in a nonstrategic manner, as applications of the S-D-S models seem 
to suggest. Instead, in our setting each firm must figure out what will be 
the total output in equilibrium when choosing its own quantity. This is 
not what we typically encounter in a differentiated oligopolistic market 
when (almost all) individual decisions made by the other firms are needed 
by each firm. Here, we have a setting in which each firm must know only 
a global statistics about the market but not its details. We agree with 
Chamberlin’s (1933, p.74) when he writes:
‘Theory may well disregard the interdependence between mar­




























































































However one should not go too far into tins direction. We believe 
that using a statistics of the market is a particularly appealing way to 
capture the idea of monopolistic competition because it saves the essence 
of competition by forcing each firm to account for the aggregate behavior 
of its competitors through the total industry output (or, alternatively, the 
average price index). In our opinion, this is a sort of minimum require­
ment for the word ‘competition’ to be meaningfully associated with the 
word ‘monopoly’. On the contrary, because of the particular functional 
form chosen in the central S-D-S model, firms do not need such an infor­
mation and behave like pure monopolists. As a result, while in the S-D-S 
model the market equilibrium reflects only cost and preference consider 
ations, in our framework the equilibrium also accounts for the mass of 
competing firms and, therefore, for various intensities of competition.
The atomless economy seems to be the ideal point of departure for 
our investigations of multiproduct firms. Indeed, a multiproduct firm 
can be most conveniently modelled as an atom, viz. a strictly positive 
measure subset of varieties which includes no proper subset of strictly 
positive measure. An atom is therefore a non-negligible participant to the 
market (Gabszewicz and Shitovitz, 1992). We investigate the properties 
of the market equilibrium in relation to the number of active firms. In 
particular, we identify conditions under which monopolistic competition 
may be a good approximation of the more realistic model of oligopolistic 
competition with multiproduct firms.
Among the results obtained below, we wish to single out the fol­
lowing ones. First, under monopolistic competition with single-product 
firms the market tends to overprovide diversity when the representative 
consumer has a weak preference for variety and when fixed costs are low 
relative to the market size, a result which illustrates Chamberlin’s excess 
capacity ‘theorem’. Second, we also show that the second best optimum 
leads to a smaller number of varieties sold at a lower price in a larger 
quantity than the market solution. In other words, in our setting the mar­
ket solution differs from the second best solution unlike Spence (1976b) 
and Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) who showed equivalence under the CES. 




























































































range provided by each firm narrows with the number of firms but the 
entire range of available varieties expands. Last, we are able to connect 
the two models through the following result: when the degree of product 
differentiation is high or when the economies of scope are weak, firms 
have few incentives to provide several varieties and the market outcome 
looks like the monopolistically competitive one.
The remaining part of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 
constructs a tractable model of monopolistic competition with horizontal 
product differentiation. Section 3 solves for the market equilibrium as 
well as the first and second best optima. It is shown that this model, 
while as easy to handle as the model of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), yields 
richer results in terms of optimum product diversity avoiding some of 
the main pitfalls of the S-D-S approach pointed out by Hart (1985a, b) 
and B6nassy (1996). Section 4 deals with the case of multiproduct firms. 
The fact that each firm is now an atom in the variety space shows how 
the nature of competition is affected by the switch from single-product 
to multiproduct firms. In particular, diversity is affected with respect 
to the single-product monopolistically competitive model because of the 
trade-off faced by a multiproduct firm between the following effects. The 
first one is the market expansion effect generated by proliferation; the 
second one is the cannibalization effect due to competition within each 
firm’s product line while the third one comes from the additional cost a 
firm bears each time it launches a new variety. The first effect fosters 
product diversity while the other two push toward less diversity. Section 
5 concludes.
2 The Model
There is only one factor, say labor, which is in fixed supply, say 1. There 
are two goods. The first good is homogeneous and is produced under 
constant returns to scale and perfect competition. This good is chosen 
as the numéraire. The other good is a horizontally differentiated product 
which is supplied under increasing returns to scale and imperfect compe­




























































































firm to have a negligible impact on the market outcome. To this end, we 
assume that there is a continuum N  of firms so that all the unknowns 
of our model are described by density functions. Because of competi­
tion, any two firms do not want to sell the same variety, thus implying a 
one-to-one relationship between firms and varieties.
Consider a representative consumer whose preferences are described 
by the following quasi-linear utility function which is supposed to be 
symmetric in all varieties:
where q(i) is the quantity of variety i € [0, N ] and qo the quantity of 
the numéraire. The parameters in (1) are such that a > 0 and 0 > 
7 > 0, while K  is a constant. In this expression, a is a measure of 
the size of the market (since it expresses the intensity of preferences 
for the differentiated product), whereas a large value for 0 means that 
the representative consumer is biased toward a dispersed consumption of 
varieties, thus reflecting a love for variety.2 For a given value of 0, the 
parameter 7 expresses the substitutability between varieties: the higher 
7 , the closer substitutes the varieties.3 Finally, we assume that the initial 
endowment q in the numéraire is large enough for the consumption of the 
numéraire to be strictly positive at the market and optimal solutions.
We may identify a simple condition on the parameters 0  and 7 such 
that the representative consumer shows a taste for variety. In the spirit 
of Bénassy (1996), we say that the consumer has a taste for variety if 
she prefers n varieties (when n is now an integer) in quantity q each to
2The intuition behind this interpretation is very similar to the the one that stands 
behind the Herfindahl index used to measure industrial concentration. Controlling 
for the total amount of the differentiated good consumption, the absolute value of the 
quadratic term in (1 ) increases with concentration of consumption on few varieties, 
thus decreasing utility.
3The quadratic utility model may be given a disaggregate foundation in terms of 
the spatial model of product differentiation. In such a context, 7  is an inverse measure 





























































































a single variety supplied in quantity nq, for all q > 0 and all n > 2. 
Rewriting (1) when n is an integer yields
U(q0;q{i),i  6  { 1 , - - , « } )  =  K + a f ^ q W — p j T q i t f - i f ^ j r  <?W<7(j)+<?o
«= 1  Z  i = l  1=1 > = 1
;#•
Evaluating this expression at <7(1) =  q for all i = 1, ...,n and using the 
utility U = K  + aQ — \0Q 2 when a single variety is supplied in quantity 
Q = nq, we see that Benassy’s condition becomes
K  + anq — ~:0nq2 — 7n(n — 1 )<j2 > K  + anq — -0(nq)2 
2 2
which holds if and only if
P > 27 (2)
In words, the quadratic utility function exhibits a preference for variety 
when the product is differentiated enough. Clearly, the smaller is 7 and /or 
the larger is 0, the stronger is the preference for variety.
In many applications of the S-D-S model, a Cobb-Douglas prefer­
ence on the homogeneous and differentiated goods with CES subutility 
is considered, while we assume instead a quasi-linear preference with a 
quadratic subutility. Observe that both utilities correspond to two rather 
extreme cases: the former assumes a unit elasticity of substitution, the 
latter an infinite elasticity between the differentiated product and the 
numéraire. Finally, since the marginal utility of the numéraire is con­
stant, our model can be used in welfare comparisons while this is not 
necessarily true with the CES (see Anderson et al. (1992, Ch.3)).
The representative consumer is endowed with one unit of labor. Her 
budget constraint can then be written as follows:
f NJQ +q0 = w + q (3)
where w is the wage and p(i) the price of variety i.
Solving (3) for the numéraire consumption, substituting the corre­
sponding expression into (1 ) and solving the first order conditions with 
respect to q(i) yields inverse demands:





























































































(5)<3 =  /  QÜ)djJo
is the total market output of the differentiated product.
Since firm i faces the demand function (4), it can be seen that firms 
do not interact directly. However they do interact indirectly through an 
aggregate demand effect as shown by the presence of Q in (4). Thus, 
though each firm is negligible to the market, when choosing its output 
level it must figure out what the total output (5) will be. Stated differ­
ently, we have a model in which a firm correctly neglects its impact on 
the market but must explicitly account for the impact of the market on 
its profit.* It then follows from our discussion above that assumption
(i) discussed in 2.1 is not inherent to monopolistic competition models. 
Furthermore, unlike the central model of Dixit and Stiglitz, the elasticity 
of (4) is variable.
Technology in the homogeneous production requires one unit of la­
bor in order to produce one unit of output. The choice of this good as 
the numéraire implies that in equilibrium w =  1. Technology in manu­
facturing requires F  < 1 units of labor in order to produce any amount 
of a variety and the marginal cost of production of a variety is equal to 
zero. This simplifying assumption, which is standard in many models of 
industrial organization, makes sense here because our preferences imply 
that firms use an absolute markup instead of a relative one when choos­
ing prices. In Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), there would be no equilibrium 
under such an assumption.
The assumptions above imply a perfectly symmetric setting. Hence 
we may focus on an equilibrium in which all firms produce the same 
output q sold at the same price p, and concentrate on the issue of product 
diversity without being concerned about product selection. This implies 
that the budget constraint (3) can be rewritten as follows:
Npq +  q0 = 1 +  q 4
4 The same holds in the Dixit-Stiglitz model with a continuum of firms but there 
each firm must account for the price index only when they make their entry decision. 




























































































Finally, entry and exit are free so that profits are zero in equilibrium. Be­
fore proceeding, it is worth stressing here that our model builds on the 
recent debate on the approximation approach to closed form solutions in 
the S-D-S model. This debate arises from the fact that the analytical re­
sults by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) and those in the first model by Spence 
(1976b) are obtained using an approximate solution method based on the 
assumption that, if there are many firms, (i) their influence on the aggre­
gate price index can be ignored as well as (ii) their direct interactions in 
the product and labor markets (i.e. each producer ignores the cross-price 
elasticities). Subsequent research has mainly focused on the question of 
how many is ‘many’. Yang and Heijdra (1993) propose to relax assump­
tion (i). Limiting their model to the special case of unit elasticity of 
intersectoral substitution, they show that, at the market outcome, Dixit 
and Stiglitz’s central model underestimates the number of firms, under­
estimates prices and overestimates quantities. In their reply, Dixit and 
Stiglitz (1993) observe that Yang and Heijdra’s approach is still an (pos­
sibly inconsistent) approximation because, if it disregards assumption (i) 
it still keeps assumption (ii). d’Aspremont et al. (1996) move one step 
further by allowing firms to take into account the general equilibrium 
income effects of their decisions via the labor market. They show that, 
in the central model, Yang and Heijdra’s approach also underestimates 
the number of active firms even though more slightly than Dixit and 
Stiglitz’s. Moreover, they show that in an enlarged model with labor as 
an additional good, Yang and Heijdra’s approach does not necessarily 
lead to an outcome closer to the true solution than Dixit and Stiglitz’s.
3 Single-product Firms? and M onopolistic 
Com petition
3.1 T he m arket equilibrium
The representative firm maximizes profit:




























































































subject to (4) with respect to its output q(i). Using symmetry among 
firms in the first order conditions gives equilibrium quantity:
Q
q=  2/?+ 7 N
and, using (4), equilibrium price:
q/3
P = 2/3 + 7AT
(7)
( 8 )
as functions of the number of active firms N. This is a significant de­
parture from Spence (1976b) and Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) in which the 
equilibrium price is a constant relative markup times marginal cost. By 
contrast, the equilibrium price is here given by an absolute markup (re­
call that marginal cost is zero) which decreases with the number of firms. 
The markup also rises when there is more product differentiation (7 falls). 
It is worth noting that these effects concur with what is observed in in­
dustrial organization models of product differentiation (Archibald et al. 
(1986); Anderson et al. (1992)), while they are not part of the S-D-S 
model.
In equilibrium, we also have:
a -  0q — 7Nq =  a  -  (0 + 7N)q =  p (9)
which shows how increasing product diversity N  within the industry 
shifts downward a firm’s demand by reducing the value of its intercept. 
Accordingly, (4) might be interpreted as Chamberlin’s dd-demand curve 
when the size of the industry is given, whereas (9) would correspond to 
his DD-curve. As usual, the DD-curve is steeper than the dd-curve but 
has a larger intercept.
The equilibrium value of N  can be found by setting (6) equal to 
zero after substituting for (7) and (8):
a J p / F - 2 0
N* = ---------  (10)
7
As expected, for 7 > 0, the equilibrium number of firms increases when 




























































































AT* > 0 if and only if
Q > 2  y/fiF (11)
that is, if and only if the fixed cost of a firm is small relative to market
size.
Substituting (10) in (7) gives the equilibrium quantity:
9* =  y/F/P (12)
while introducing (10) in (8) gives the equilibrium price:
P* =  (13)
so that revenues (q'p") are just sufficient to cover the fixed cost.
Observe that we have chosen to conduct our analysis in terms of 
quantity-setting firms, as in Spence (1976b) and Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). 
It is worth noting that the same results could have been obtained with 
price-setting firms as shown in the appendix. While the choice of quantity 
or price as a decision variable is a crucial one in oligopolistic competition, 
it does not seem to be essential for monopolistic competition.
3.2 T he first b est optim um
A planner seeking the first best maximizes the utility of the representative 
consumer evaluated at a symmetric outcome
U — K  + aNq -  ^N q 2 -  7N 2q2 + q0 
with respect to q and N  subject to the resource constraint:
F N  -I- q0 =  1 + q
The first order condition on q requires:




























































































while the first order condition on N  means that: 
aq — ^ q2 — 2~fNq2 — F  = 0
Together, these conditions imply that the optimum output of each 
variety is:
q° = y/2F/0 (15)
while the optimal number of varieties of the differentiated product is 
given by:
a j m - 0
27
Given any 7 > 0, N° is positive if and only if
a > \[W F
(16)
(17)
We now check that the shadow price of a variety equals marginal 
cost. At the optimum, the shadow price p° is the same across varieties 




which says that the marginal rate of substitution between the differenti­
ated product and the numéraire is equal to the price ratio. Using (14), 
we obtain:
dU/dq = N(a — Pq — 2y Nq) =  0
dU/Pqo
implying that the shadow price p° is zero, that is, marginal cost.
Using (12) and (15), it is readily verified that we always have q° > q’ 
and p° < p*. In order to compare the equilibrium and optimum numbers 
of firms, a must satisfy both (11) and (17), that is, the former which is 
the more stringent.
Clearly, we have N * > N° if and only if
o > q = 3v/2 





























































































The results above mean that, in monopolistic competition, the equi­
librium number of varieties may be larger than the optimum number, a 
result in sharp contrast to that obtained by Spence (1976b) and Dixit and 
Stiglitz (1977) in the CES case.5 In particular, we see that the market 
tends to overprovide variety (an example of Chamberlin’s excess capac­
ity) when the representative consumer has a weak preference for variety 
(see (2)) and when fixed cost F  are low compared to the market size, a 
very intuitive result. Consequently, the quadratic utility model allows 
us to qualify the assertion made by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) about the 
generality of their model: “With variable elasticities (...) there [is] some 
presumption that the market solution would be characterized by too few 
firms in the monopolistically competitive sector” (p.308). This difference 
in results is due to the fact that, in the S-D-S model, the equilibrium price 
is so low6 that the incumbents’ profits are low enough to deter entry, thus 
leading to insufficient product diversity. On the contrary, in our model, 
the equilibrium price varies with the number of firms, thus allowing the 
incumbents to charge a higher price and to earn higher profits (letting 
N  go to infinity in our setting would lead to zero price, negative profits 
and no entry). In general, the comparison between the market equilibrium 
and the optimum outcomes is therefore ambiguous, as already noticed by 
Meade (1974) in a different, less formal setting.
By contrast, when the product is very differentiated in that (18) 
holds, the market always overprovides product diversity, thus confirming 
other existing analyses (see, e.g. Archibald et al. (1986); Anderson et al. 
(1995)).
3.3 T h e second best optim um
Since profits are always negative and equal to — F  at the first best opti­
mum, a planner constrained by the absence of lump-sum transfers may
5Recall that Salop (1979) shows that excess variety characterizes spatial models of 
monopolistic competition.
6 If one considers the sequence of Nash price equilibria of games involving an integer 
number N  of firms, the S-D-S equilibrium price is the limit of this sequence when 





























































































U =  K  + a N q - ^ N q 2 - 7 /V y  + q0 (19)
(where we have used again symmetry among varieties) with respect to q 
and N  subject to the consumer budget constraint:
Npq + q0 = l + q (20)
the zero profit condition:
pq — F = 0 (21)
and the demand function:
p = a - ( 0  + -yN)q (22)
Plugging (22) into (20) as well as into (21) and the corresponding 
results into (19), the constrained planner maximizes:
U = K  + -£ -(a q -0 q 2 - F )
Thus, the second best quantity is:
which is the quantity that a firm would choose if disregarding the impact 





By (21) and (22), this implies:
vS _  0(a2 -  40F)
q27




























































































Note also that (11) implies that ps < p*, that is, the second best 
price is always below the market price. Using again (11), we see that 
qs > 9*. It remains to compare N ’ and N s . We have
which holds because of (11) so that N" > N s .
To sum-up: the second best optimum leads to a smaller number 
of varieties sold at a lower price in a larger quantity than the market 
solution. Hence, in our setting, the market solution does differ from the 
second best solution unlike Spence (1976b) and Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) 
who showed equivalence under the CES.7
4 Com petition with M ultiproduct Firms
So far we have considered a one-to-one relationship between firms and 
varieties. We now investigate the implications of having o finite number 
of multiproduct firms, each supplying a non-negligible set of varieties. 
For that, it is assumed that, in addition to the cost associated with each 
supplied variety, each firm has to pay an entry cost regardless of the size 
of its product range, thus implying that economies of scope are present. 
Because multiproduct firms are ‘large actors’, they now interact in a more 
strategic way than in the section above. In other words, firms now behave 
like oligopolists. In addition, the possibility of choosing its product range 
gives each firm an additional tool to challenge its competitors.
7This coincidence result depends crucially on the CES assumption (Spence, 1976b; 
Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977) and on the related “accidental implicit choice of the ‘taste 
of variety’ parameter” (Benassy, 1996).
a J p / F - 2 0  ^  d(Q2 -  4 (3F)





























































































We want to know whether this increased interaction improves upon 
the market equilibrium described in the foregoing. To this end, we con­
sider a very simple setting in which each active firm, first, chooses its 
product range and, then, the quantity of each variety it supplies. In 
the same spirit as in the section above in which a firm can be identified 
with the variety it supplies, we assume here that each firm has access to 
an exclusive continuum of potential symmetric varieties. However, since 
launching a variety involves some positive cost, a firm does not neces­
sarily produce all these varieties and must choose how many of them to 
supply. Formally, this implies that the strategy spaces are such that the 
overlap of the product lines of any two firms is a zero measure set. The 
market solution is given by a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium; we look 
for a symmetric equilibrium and will describe the equilibrium path only. 
Since our purpose is to keep the analysis as intuitive as possible, we will 
refrain from providing a full description of the game.
Let M  be a given (integer) number of multiproduct firms facing an 
identical entry cost G and an identical fixed cost F  per variety. We denote 
by Hi C R+ the set of varieties w produced by firm i (= 1,..., M). Because 
of our symmetry assumption, it will be convenient to describe its size by 
Hi too. The total production cost of firm i is then given by G + FCli .Firm 
i maximizes its profit given by:
Ili =  J \pi(u))qi(uj) -  F]du -  G (23)
where Pi(u) is the price of variety ui supplied by firm i and q,{ui) the 
quantity of this variety. Demand for variety u> is still defined by (4). 
However, because a firm now controls a non-negligible set of varieties, the 
total output <5 is no longer given to the firm since it varies with its own 
output. Since we focus on a symmetric outcome, we may assume that all 
the other firms choose the same product range H C R+. Consequently, 
we have:
Qi — J qi{u)du> +  (Af -  1 ) J q(iv)du) (24)
where the first integral corresponds to the demand for the varieties pro­




























































































its competitors. Note the difference with the monopolistic competition 
model where the total output of the industry (5) is unaffected by a single 
firm’s decision, while here it varies with each firm’s decision as shown by
(24).
The solution of the second stage subgame is obtained as follows. 
Because we have symmetry among varieties within each firm’s product 
line, the quantity supplied by a firm is the same across its varieties. In 
other words, we have q,(u>) =  qt for all ui € 12, and q(ui) =  q for all ui € fi. 
Consequently, (23) may rewritten as follows:
n< =  (p,9, -  F)Ui -  G
whereas (24) becomes
Qi =  qifti +  (M -  l)çO
Hence we have
fl, =  {[a -  Pqi -  7[<7A +  (M -  l)<jT2] qt -  F}Q, — G
Applying the first order condition with respect to qit the equilibrium 
output q’ must satisfy:
a  -  2PqT -  27n i9* -  7(M -  l)qU = 0
so that the equilibrium quantity of each variety provided by firm i is:
q‘(n„ Q)
a — 7 (M — l)gf2
2(0 +  7«i)
(25)
The equilibrium quantity of each supplied variety thus decreases with 
the size of the firm i ’s product range. Cannibalization arises despite the 
fact that the representative consumer (who loves variety) spends more 
on the differentiated product when the number of varieties rises. Indeed, 
she chooses to distribute her higher expenditure in a way that reduces 
the consumption of each variety. Consequently, brand proliferation is 
not just limited by the fixed cost associated with the launching of a new 




























































































The equilibrium price charged by firm i for all its varieties is:
P*(ft.,ft) =
q — 7 (M — 1 )qfl 
2~  ~ (26)
which is decreasing in 17 because a wider array of products supplied by 
rivals makes firm i ’s market more competitive.
The second-staged equilibrium profit of firm i is then given by (23) 
after having substituted for (25) and (26):
n,(ft„n) [a — 7 (M — l)<j!7]2 
4 (0 +  7ft,)
n, -  Fi7, -  c (27)
which describes the payoff of firm i in the first stage game, conditional 
upon the fact that the others choose the product range 17.
The expression (27) has a unique and finite maximum since 11;(17,, 17) 
is strictly concave in 17; and becomes arbitrarily small for large enough 
17;. In order to determine the equilibrium product range at the symmet­
ric equilibrium of the first stage game, we differentiate (27) with respect 
to 17;, set 17; =  17 and obtain after some simple manipulations:
(28)
In a symmetric equilibrium, it must be that q*(17t, 17) =  q and 17; = 17. 
By substitution in (25), we obtain:
Q =
a  — 7 (A/ — 1)§17
2(/3 + 7 « )
which, together with (28), yields the equilibrium output which is still 
equal to (12):
9* = \ / ^ 09
Observe that the quantity of each variety supplied by the multiprod­
uct firm in oligopolistic competition is the same as that produced by 
the single-product firm under monopolistic competition. Moreover, the 





























































































a y / p / F -  20 
7 (M 4- 1)
For f!' to be positive, we need condition (11) to hold. Clearly, the lower 
the fixed cost associated with the launching of a new variety or the higher 
the degree of product differentiation, the wider is the firm’s product 
range, as in Anderson and de Palma (1992).
It thus appears that, though the quantity supplied of each variety 
is independent of the number of firms, the number of varieties supplied 
by a firm decreases as the number of firms rises. In the limit, fl* —* 0 
when M  —> oo, namely each firm wants to sell a single product (formally, 
a zero measure set of varieties) when the number of firms is arbitrarily 
large.
Furthermore, the total number of varieties is given by:
N' (M)  =  MCI'
ayfp/F  -  2/3 M  
7 M + 1
(29)
which converges from below toward (10) when M  —* oo.
is:
Using (26), the equilibrium price common to all firms and varieties
P'(M)  =
( M  +  1)
(30)
When M  —» oo, this price converges from above toward (13), that is, the 
equilibrium market price in the single-product monopolistic competition 
case.
We can now determine the number of firms that are active in equi­
librium as a function of the entry cost G. This requires finding M (which 
is now treated as a real number) such that:
p' (M)q’ü' (M)  -  FfT(M) -  G = 0
the solution of which is easily calculated as:






























































































For A/* to be positive, we need
a > 2\/0F  +  \J^G
which is more stringent than (11). In other words, (32) is the condition 
to be imposed to the parameters of the economy for a positive number 
of firms to offer more than one variety.
The corresponding equilibrium price may be obtained by substitut­
ing (31) into (30) as follows:
P* = y/0F + \frG
which converges from above towards the monopolistic competitive price 
(13) when G —♦ 0 (no scope economies) and/or 7 —* 0 (varieties are 
independent). In addition, if F  —♦ 0, p* =  0, that is, the competitive 
level. As for the long run equilibrium product range, it is obtained by 
plugging (31) into (29):
fi* =
Clearly, the equilibrium product range expands with love for variety, 
scope economies and the degree of product differentiation while it nar­
rows with the cost of launching an additional variety. Hence, in choosing 
their product line, firms trade the potential gains of economies of scope 
(G) and of the potential increase in market power generated by an ex­
pansion of their product line (the interplay between /? and 7) against the 
corresponding launching costs (F).
The total number of varieties supplied by the multiproduct firms
given by ___
J 0 /F (a  -  -  yffG)
N ' = AT n* =  --------— ------  ̂ (33)
7
is smaller than the number of varieties under monopolistic competition 
as shown by comparing (10) and (33). When G —* 0, the number M ' of 
firms becomes arbitrarily large and the range of varieties N * converges 
toward (10). Since the ratio between (10) and (33) goes to one when 
7 —► 0, we can say that the two market product ranges tend to coincide 




























































































As expected, the total number of firms M * rises with the market size 
(a) and the degree of product differentiation ( I /7 ) whereas it decreases 
with the launching cost of a variety (F), the economies of scope (G) 
and the love for variety (/?). In particular, when G —> 0 and/or 7 —* 0, 
the number M ’ of firms becomes arbitrarily large, and the market with 
multiproduct firms supplies almost the same range of varieties at almost 
the same price as under monopolistic competition.
In view of these results, it is fair to conclude that monopolistic 
competition is the limiting case of oligopolistic competition with mul­
tiproduct firms as either varieties get more and more differentiated or 
economies of scope get weaker and weaker.8 In a metaphorical sense, as 
scope economies vanish each atomic firm dissolves in an ocean of negli­
gible firms offering each a single variety.
It remains to compare the market outcome to the optimum. Since 
there are economies of scope, it is always optimal to have a single firm 
producing the entire range of varieties. In others words, we have M° = 
1 so it must be that N° =  fl°.9 It is then obvious that the optimal 
number of varieties is still given by (16). Hence, though the market 
with multiproduct firms always involves too many firms, the number 
of varieties may be too large or too small depending on the difference 
between (33) and (16).
Since the number of varieties is always smaller under oligopolistic 
competition with multiproduct firms than under monopolistic competi­
tion with single-product firms (see (33)), the market outcome with mul­
tiproduct firms is even further away from the optimum whenever the mo­
nopolistic competitive market underprovides variety, namely when (18) 
does not hold. When by contrast this condition holds, we know that the 
monopolistic competitive market overprovides variety. This is not neces­
sarily the case under oligopolistic competition where it is readily verified
8 When G and 7  converge together to zero, we assume that the former decreases 
faster than the latter in order to avoid perverse limiting behavior of fi'.
9Note that Anderson and de Palma (1992) obtain the same result when intrafirm 




























































































that the market overprovides variety if and only if
a > ^ - - ^ ^ F  + ‘2 ^ C )  (34)
This condition is clearly more stringent than (18). Therefore, when (18) 
holds but (34) does not, monopolistic competition provides too much 
diversity whereas oligopolistic competition does not supply enough at 
the market outcome. In other words, market structure matters for the 
comparison between the equilibrium and the optimum.
The foregoing analysis suggests a new testable property of market 
structure with respect to product differentiation and scope economies. 
Product differentiation is low and scope economies are weak in indus­
tries where firms offer each a narrow product line, whereas firms with 
wide product lines axe more likely to be observed in markets in which 
products are very differentiated and economies of scope are strong. Fur­
thermore, with high product differentiation and weak scope economies 
the market structure is likely to involve many firms and a great deal of 
product diversity, whereas few firms and little product diversity should 
be observed with low product differentiation and strong scope economies.
5 Concluding Remarks
Our purpose was twofold. First, we have designed an alternative model 
of monopolistic competition which is both tractable and intuitively plau­
sible. It turns out that this model allows us to formalize the idea of 
monopolistic competition in a way that places it between oligopolistic 
competition and perfect competition. We have shown that this model, 
while easier to handle than the model by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), yields 
richer results in terms of optimum product diversity while avoiding some 
of the main pitfalls of the S-D-S approach. Given the high flexibility of 
the model proposed, we may reasonably expect it to be useful in appli­
cations where the S-D-S model have led to new and relevant economic 




























































































our model does not seem appealing to study long run growth of a bal­
anced kind, it should permit to test the robustness of existing results 
often criticized for their lack of generality. If so, this would suggest the 
existence of a whole class of monopolistically competitive economies for 
which some of the main results derived in trade, growth, geography, or 
macroeconomics, hold true. A first attempt undertaken by the authors 
in economic geography shows both the robustness of the main results as 
well as the limits of the approach followed in the literature (Ottaviano 
and Thisse, 1998). In addition, we conjecture that the model could be 
suitable to study a broader set of issues once we allow the parameters of 
the utility function (1 ) to be dependent on the income level and/or the 
size of the product range, an assumption that would reflect changes in 
preferences as the economy expands.
Second, we have explored a topic so fax untouched, namely the re­
lationships between monopolistic competition with single-product firms 
and oligopolistic competition with firms supplying wide arrays of vari­
eties. The real world is repleaded with such big oligopolists and it is 
important to assess the quality of the approximation made by using mo­
nopolistic competition in applications. It seems to us that the conclusions 
derived in the foregoing are positive enough to justify further explorations 
of the theoretical foundations of monopolistic competition and to test the 
validity of propositions obtained in applications against alternative for­
mulations of monopolistic competition. In particular, we have shown the 
existence of a trade-off faced by multiproduct firms between economies 
of scope, cannibalization, and the cost of expanding the product line.
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Appendix
We first derive the demand system and then show that the market 
outcome with price-making firms is identical to that with quantity-setting 
firms under monopolistic competition.
We know from (4) that the inverse demands are given by:
p(0 =  q -  (Jq{i) -  7 f q[j)dj (35)
Jo
Integrating over varieties yields
r N  '  r N  r N





























































































from which we obtain
"  . . . . .  a N - f 0Np{i)dir/ q{i)di =JO
Introducing into (35) leads to
p(i) = a -  0q(i) -  7
from which it follows that
0 + ^N
a N - f 0Np(i)di
0  +  7 N
0q(i) = -a- -  p (*) +  7
r S
/ p{i)di Jo0  4- 7 ./V 0  +  7AT.
Adding and substracting N ryp(i)/(0 +  7AT), we get after simplifications
9(0 =
a
1 fP(*) +  7 /  K ?) ~ P(*)ldJ (36)Wo,3 +  77V /? +  7A7 0(0  + 7 AT)
Profits are still given by (6) where g(t) is now given by (36). Differ­
entiating the corresponding expression with respect to price and focussing 
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